A practical security checklist for high profile events

High-profile event security requires careful planning. This practical checklist covers physical, cyber, personnel, third-party and hybrid threats.

When managing an event, whether that be a high profile meeting, conference, or national election, the risk goes up. Organisers need to understand why and how attackers will look to sabotage or infiltrate all kinds of events to meet their ends.

The security arrangements  need to reflect what is different about that particular event. The venue may be familiar and the usual controls well established, but the people attending, the level of public interest, temporary access, additional suppliers and wider threat picture can all change what is required. 

For higher risk events, these areas cannot be planned in isolation. Physical security, cyber, people, information and third-party risk rarely stay separated once an incident is underway. Hybrid threats can exploit the connections between them, with activity in one area creating vulnerabilities, disruption or confusion elsewhere. 

The threat picture 

The threat assessment should be built around the specific event, with strategic context understood and considered throughout.It should be reviewed regularly as the date approaches. The profile of attendees, location, political context, media interest and any expected protest activity will all shape what is relevant. 

The threat may extend beyond disruption of the event itself. A high-profile gathering can present an opportunity for hostile reconnaissance, espionage, targeting of specific attendees or the collection of information for use later. Where an event is politically sensitive, misinformation also becomes relevant, particularly in the period between an incident occurring and the facts being established.  

The threat picture can change considerably in the final days. We regularly see late changes to attendee lists, emerging protest activity or new intelligence requiring plans to be revisited at short notice. 

Venue and surrounding area 

The venue should be assessed in the context of the event rather than relying on its standard security arrangements. This should include the surrounding area, approaches, service and vehicle access and the routes being used by attendees, staff and contractors, as well as any changes to normal circulation inside the venue. 

Physical walk-throughs remain one of the most effective assessment tools. Plans and drawings rarely reveal operational realities such as poorly controlled service entrances, exposed infrastructure, predictable movement patterns or bottlenecks that emerge when large numbers of people arrive simultaneously. 

Where the threat profile justifies it, hostile reconnaissance should also be considered. What can be observed from public areas? Could attendee movements, procedures or restricted locations be identified in advance? What information is visible to someone actively looking for it? Can the technical environment by exposed and attacked through physical access? 

Access management 

Access becomes more complex in the run up to an event. Venue staff, contractors, production teams, security providers, speakers, media and other suppliers may all require different levels of access at different stages. 

One of the issues we see is access being approved in isolation. Different teams authorise physical access, system access or contractor permissions without necessarily having sight of the overall picture. This can leave individuals or suppliers with broader access than was originally intended. 

Physical and system access should therefore be considered together. Build and breakdown periods also deserve particular attention, with high volumes of suppliers, temporary workers and equipment moving through the venue, often when fewer people are around to notice or challenge something unusual. 

Critical systems and third parties 

Access control, guest registration, CCTV, communications, connectivity and building systems may all be important to the security operation, with external suppliers often responsible for supporting or recovering them. For critical services, it is important to understand those dependencies and what happens if something becomes unavailable. 

Contingency arrangements are particularly worth testing. A fallback may still rely on the same connectivity, infrastructure, supplier or administrator as the primary service. If an access control or guest registration system fails during the main arrival period, for example, teams still need to manage entry securely while dealing with the additional pressure that is created. 

For critical suppliers, the practical arrangements should be checked rather than relying on what is set out in the contract. Who will actually be available during the event, including out of hours? How quickly can they respond, and what access will they need if a service has to be investigated or restored? 

Where responsibility is shared between the venue, suppliers and the organisation’s own teams, it should also be clear who takes the lead if something goes wrong. 

Exercising the arrangements 

Exercises are most useful when they focus on what is different or has not been tested before, particularly where several teams or organisations need to work together. 

It is also worth testing more than one problem at a time. Protest activity affecting an entrance alongside an access control problem, a loss of communications during an incident or conflicting reports circulating while the facts are still being established will put very different pressure on the response. 

This is also an opportunity to test the handovers between the venue, security, IT, operations, communications and third parties, particularly where responsibility for an incident could move from one team to another. 

Event Security Checklist 

Threat and governance 

• Is the threat assessment current and specific to the event? 
• Have the objectives and capabilities of relevant threat actors been considered? 
• Are responsibilities clear across the organisations involved? 
• Can security arrangements be adapted if the threat picture changes? 
• Have potential hybrid threat scenarios been considered, including how physical, cyber, information and people related risks could interact? 

Venue and physical security 

• Have the venue and surrounding area been physically assessed for this event? 
• Have the entrances, exits, service routes, vehicle access and emergency routes been reviewed? 
• Have temporary changes to circulation, screening and registration been considered? 
• Have restricted areas, critical infrastructure and opportunities for hostile reconnaissance been considered? 

Access and personnel 

• Is there a clear picture of who requires access, where and for how long? 
• Have physical and system permissions been considered together? 
• Have temporary staff, contractors and suppliers been assessed appropriately for their level of access? 
• Have build, breakdown and event-specific access arrangements been included in the security plan? 

Systems and dependencies 

• Have critical systems and services, including their technical, physical and third-party dependencies been identified? 
• Are shared dependencies and single points of failure understood? 
• Can contingency arrangements operate independently of the systems they replace? 
• Can critical suppliers support or recover services within the timescales required? 

Information and response 

• Can security, cyber, venue, operations and communications teams share relevant information quickly? 
• Is there a process for handling incomplete, conflicting or misleading information? 
• Are alternative communications available if primary channels are disrupted? 
• Have response arrangements been exercised across physical, cyber and operational boundaries? 
• Are decision-making authority and responsibilities clear across the organisations involved? 

No event plan will account for every eventuality, therefore the decision making matrix (including escalation routes) needs to be crystal clear across stakeholders. Key risks and dependencies need to be understood, responsibilities need to be clear and the arrangements tested under realistic conditions. For high-profile events, this increasingly means preparing for hybrid threats that can cross physical, cyber, information and operational boundaries. Being able to recognise and respond to a change in the threat or operating environment can be just as important as the controls put in place beforehand.